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RECENT DECISIONS
Justice Holmes dissented also in Black & White Taxicab and Trans-
fer Co. v. Brown & Yellow T. & T. Co.: 37 "If within the limits of
the Constitution a State should declare one of the disputed rules of
general law by statute there would be no doubt of the duty of all
Courts to bow * * *. I see no reason why it should have less effect
when it speaks by its other voice. If a state constitution should de-
clare that on all matters of general law the decisions of the highest
Court should establish the law until modified by statute or by a later
decision of the same Court, I do not perceive how it would be pos-
sible for a Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the
State Court decided in that domain. But when the constitution of a
State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make that
declaration as clearly as if it had said it in express words * * *." 38
No doubt all these dissenting opinions, in conjunction with the
extensive criticisms,39 have been responsible for the instant case, so
that we may now say that the lex loci would govern in all diversity
of citizenship suits in the federal courts where questions of general
jurisprudence arise. It is submitted that the instant case is only a
precursor, for there are many questions left unanswered. Is Congress
free to enact a law reiterating the Swift doctrine? Is equity involved?
If there are no statutes or decisions upon certain matters of general
law, will a Supreme Court decision be followed in a subsequent state
case, or will the state judges pride themselves on being able to over-
rule the United States courts? The answers to all these questions
must be left to the future. 40
A. M.A.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-SviET DECREES NATIONALIZING Rus-
SIAN INSURANCE COMPANIES-ASSIGNMENT OF ASSETS TO THE
UNITED STATES-EXTRATERRITORIALITY.-As a consequence of na-
tionalization by Soviet decrees in the years 1918 and 1919 of the
Russian insurance companies and the confiscation of their property,
cancellation of their debts, and extinguishment of the rights of share-
holders, there followed a liquidation of the American branches of the
Russian insurance companies here. However, because of the non-
recognition of Russia in 1931, the surpluses could not be remitted to
domiciliary receivers in that country. Lest the surpluses be lost, it
=276 U. S. 518, 532, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 408 (1928).
Id. at 534 (Brandeis and Stone, JJ., concurred in this dissent).
' See notes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
' For recent criticisms of the instant case see Note (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 71; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1336; Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 26
A. B. A. J. 421.
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was directed I that they be turned over to the conservators or direc-
tors of the companies. Following a liquidation proceeding 2 of the
Moscow Fire Insurance Company, its sole surviving director duly be-
came the conservator and remitted its assets to the defendant bank.
Thereupon the insurance company and its conservator, and later cer-
tain shareholders, instituted actions to determine that the assets be
payable to the creditors and shareholders. After both actions were
consolidated, all claims of creditors and shareholders were adjudicated
in 1934. In 1936, having failed in the federal courts, the United
States, appellant, was permitted to intervene in the consolidated actions
upon a petition, which prayed for a vacatur of the judgment of 1934,
asserting title to the assets on the grounds that they were assigned to
the intervenor on the occasion of the United States according recogni-
tion to Russia in 1933. On appeal from a dismissal of the petition by
the court below, held, affirmed. The evidence adduced showed that
the decrees confiscating the assets of the insurance company were not
intended to apply to assets situated outside of Russia and in the United
States. Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York, 253 App.
Div. 644, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 653 (1st Dept. 1938).'
Assuming that the decrees were extraterritorial the same result
would have been attained.4 Acts, statutes, or decrees of a foreign
state have no force beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which
- their authority is derived.5 Universal acknowledgment is given to the
principle of the perfect equality of nations., Thus, it cannot be de-
manded as a matter of strict right that laws or decrees of one nation
be enforced within the jurisdictions of this state or nation, or any
other nation.7 At times enforcement of foreign laws or decrees is
permitted only because of comity which exists between states and
nations; 8 but, although comity is something more than mere political
'Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 175 N. E.
114 (1931).
Matter of People (Moscow Fire Insurance Co.), 255 N. Y. 433, 175 N. E.
120 (1931).
' Memorandum decision-no opinion. See Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank
of New York, 161 Misc. 903, 294 N. Y .Supp. 648 (1937), for an elaborate
history of the case.
" It was shown by Referee Donnelly in his opinion (see note 3, supra) that
the decrees were not intended to have any effect outside the boundaries of
Soviet jurisdiction. However, in a didactic dicta the referee traces the law
and proves that the result would have been the same if the decrees were extra-
territorial.
' Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139 (1894) ; Matter of Waite,
99 N. Y. 433, 2 N. E. '440 (1885); Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N. Y. 33,
161 N. E. 321 (1928).
'The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66 (U. S. 1825).
'Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (U. S. 1808) ; The Appalon, 9 Wheat. 362
(U. S. 1824) ; Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct.
593 (1924); United States v. Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463,
56 Sup. Ct. 343 (1935).
' See note 7, supra; Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U. S. 580, 31 Sup. Ct. 669
(1911) ; MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) § 197.
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courtesy, it is not obligatory and will not operate when it is contrary
to the public policy or prejudicial to the interests of the forum which
is asked to apply it.9
Going to its constitution, its laws, and judicial decisions we find
the public policy of the State of New York.10 It is the established
law in New York that the assets of a dissolved or liquidated corpora-
tion are not subject to confiscation," nor do they escheat to the state,
but rather, the assets are to be held for distribution to the creditors
and shareholders, wherever they may be, as their own property.
12
Indeed, the United States has not only recognized the New York rule
of public policy,'3 but entertains the same policy and would not rec-
ognize a title based upon confiscation. 14 However, it is immaterial
that the public policy of the United States is in accordance with that
of New York, for the disputed fund always had its situs in a New
York depository 15 and, thus, New York has the jurisdiction and con-
trol of the res.'6 The title to the securities depends on the lex fori
where the securities are found.' 7  Therefore, the United States is
bound by the public policy of New York like any private litigant.'
8
In this case the power of eminent domain-a fundamental gov-
ernmental power-was utilized under the Soviet decrees, but the gov-
ernment refused to compensate for the property taken, and thereby
the act resulted in confiscation. It is the rule that no matter how
broad the powers of a sovereign may be, nevertheless, they must stop
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839), wherein comity is
defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws". (Italics ours.)
See also Fisher, Brown and Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Ati. 714 (1895).
" Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
" There is a distinction between the dissolution of a corporation and the
confiscation of its assets. Only the creating state can dissolve a corporation,
Remington & Sons v. Samana Bay Co., 140 Mass. 494, 5 N. E. 292 (1886),
and no foreign state will deny it the right, even though all the corporation's
assets are located, and all the business is transacted in the foreign country.
Geo. D. Witt Shoe Co. v. Mills, 224 Ala. 500, 140 So. 578 (1932).
"People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 18 N. E. 692 (1888). The Legislature
has also declared the public policy of New York to be such as to protect
creditors and shareholders against confiscatory decrees. N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT
§ 977-b, as added by Laws of 1936, c. 917.
"Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269 (1889).
"United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (U. S. 1833); Greenwood v.
Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881).
"The deposit was created by N. Y. INs. LAw § 27; the surplus was created
by N. Y. INs. LAW § 63.
"Clark v. Willard, 294 U.' S. 211, 55 Sup. Ct. 356 (1934); Spencer v.
Myers, 150 N. Y. 269, 44 N. E. 942 (1896) ; Deschenes v.'Tallman, 248 N. Y.
33, 161 N. E. 321 (1928).
'Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 457 (1932).
"United States v. Stinson, 197 U. S. 200, 25 Sup. Ct. 426 (1904) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 45 Sup. Ct. 211 (1924).
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with confiscation.1 9 Indeed, there is such a stem adherence to this
rule that, even on the theory of constructive possession, the requisi-
tion, by a state, of property outside its jurisdiction has not been up-
held, when that property has not come within its actual possession.20
However, the New York rule should not be considered as impolitic,
for the welfare of the state depends upon it, and New York merely
shares the same rule with foreign jurisdictions. 21
E. S. S.
LABOR-CLOSED SHOP CONTRACT-MONOPOLY-GENERAL Busi-
NESS LAW SECTION 340.-Defendant Transport Workers Union of
America was the duly elected bargaining agent for the employees of
I. R. T. shops. After long negotiations and threatened strikes, a
contract was entered into between defendant union and defendant com-
pany which provided that the latter would not employ any worker
who was not, or did not become a member of the union within thirty
days. Plaintiffs were employees at the time; they refused to join the
union and were consequently discharged. In this action to enjoin
defendants from carrying out the "closed shop" contract, plaintiffs
concede that a "closed shop" contract is generally valid,' but they
contend that in this case it is invalid because, as the I. R. T. is the
only labor market locally for plaintiffs, the contract caused an unlaw-
ful monopoly; 2 they further contend that subdivision 2 of Section
340 of the General Business Law 3 is unconstitutional as violating the
"Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1926); Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276
U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353 (1927).
' Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U. S. 580, 31 Sup. Ct. 669 (1911); Petro-
gradsky M. K. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930).
'The Jupiter, 1925-26 ANN. DIG. OF INT. LAW CASES, Case No. 100;
Luther v. Sagor, L. R. [1921] 3 K. B. 532.
'NEW YORK LABOR LAW § 704, subd. 5; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207,
76 N. E. 5 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842) is the
leading case on the subject in this country. Contra: Mische v. Kaminski, 127
Pa. Super. 66, 193 Atl. 410 (1937).
2 If the employees did not join the union, they would not be able to work
at all. Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897); Grassi Co. v.
Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept. 1916); Connors
v. Connelly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913); Lehigh Co. v. Atl. Works, 92
N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376 (1920); Polk v. Cleve. Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151
N. E. 808 (1925).
The legal reasoning in many cases upholding a closed shop was that it was
not oppressive and did not operate throughout the community to prevent non-
union men from earning their livelihood; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 212,
76 N. E. 5, 7 (1905).
'This section is known as the Donnelly Anti-trust Act. Subdivision 2
expressly exempts "bona fide labor unions" from its provisions.
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